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Executive Summary
Each year, agricultural producers in the United States receive billions of dollars in federal
subsidies, crop insurance, conservation payments, and other grants.1 Defying fundamental
principles of good government that apply to other federal programs, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) is authorized to keep secret much of the basic information farmers
provide to qualify for these grants. Congress granted this unprecedented loophole in the
nation’s sunshine laws by inserting section 1619 as an amendment to the 2008 Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act. The amendment provided an exemption to the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) that covers the information farmers give USDA about their
properties.2 Unlike other federal grantees, farmers submit their business names and
locations, geographic coordinates, types of crop produced and animals raised, and farming
practices (e.g., irrigation and fertilizer or pesticide use) without ever worrying about
oversight by federal, state, or local governments, much less anyone in the private sector.
Because this basic information is kept secret, watchdog groups cannot determine whether
federal aid was warranted or whether farmers are using it correctly. Agencies enforcing
health, safety, and environmental laws are denied data that would make their routine
oversight of the industry’s compliance efficient and effective. The result is that the taxpaying
public pays repeatedly to support agricultural production: once when the original grant or
subsidy is paid, a second time if the money is misused, a third time to support the efforts
of other federal agencies to re-create the data that USDA already has, and a fourth time
when these enforcement efforts fail and agricultural pollution contaminates the soil, water,
and air.
Occasional government audits, most notably those performed by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), have found that waste and fraud plague USDA subsidies—just
as they plague other federal aid programs—demonstrating the need for more transparency,
not less.3 Congress’s willingness to make an exception for this industry reflects agriculture’s
significant lobbying presence on Capitol Hill and the fact that USDA is committed to
keeping farmers happy through friction-free federal funding.
Among the best examples of the inefficiency and overt harm caused by agriculture secrecy is
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) long-delayed efforts to regulate concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFOS), which include hog, chicken, and cattle farms. CAFOs
raise more than 40 percent of the livestock in the United States.4 These operations typically
apply the untreated manure to the land as fertilizer, and the amount and frequency of these
applications is specified in a discharge permit. Unfortunately, because EPA and the states
have dithered in implementing and enforcing these provisions, only 8,000 of 20,000—or
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40 percent—of CAFOs have the required permits.5 Release of the secret USDA data would
significantly increase the speed and accuracy of these permitting efforts, allowing EPA to
combat a leading source of impaired water quality throughout the nation.
The most commonly offered justification for agriculture’s sweeping exemption from FOIA
is the need to protect the privacy rights of individual family farmers. But this idealized
image of a nuclear family sharing an old-fashioned farm house at the end of a country lane
has little to do with the reality of farm subsidies and crop insurance. Large farms account
for the lion’s share of agricultural production in the nation—the largest 12 percent of farms
generate 84 percent of total output.6 Far from resembling individual citizens who live in
suburban and urban areas, the vast majority of the farms that qualify for federal support
are incorporated businesses that turn a profit by working the land.
This paper does not address the wisdom of federal farm supports from a public policy
perspective. We do contend that whatever the size and scope of such programs, shielding
them from independent evaluation is a policy that simply is not justifiable because it costs the
taxpayer much more money than it should. In an era when budgets are tight, the economy
is troubled, and the environment is in jeopardy, it is tempting to conclude that campaign
contributions from the largest beneficiaries of federal grants were the major motivation for
such extraordinary special treatment. Congress should repeal this exemption.7

Going Dark Down on the Farm
Section 1619 of the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act prohibits USDA and its
contractors from disclosing information provided to it by applicants or participants in
USDA grant programs.8 Ironically, the legal mechanism for this blanket exemption is the
FOIA, intended to embody “the ideal that information is the lifeblood of democracy.”9 The
Act promotes open access of government records by requiring the publication of extensive
information about government programs in the Federal Register and by allowing the
public to request and be granted access to most government-held information.10 Broadly
conceived, this last requirement allows any person access to virtually any form of
information held by the government.11
Although FOIA mandates a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure,”12 it contains nine
exemptions that explicitly prohibit disclosure and public access to information because
releasing it would jeopardize national security or invade an individual person’s privacy
rights. Section 1619 falls under exemption 3, which prohibits disclosure of information
specifically exempted from disclosure by a statute if that statute requires the matters to be
withheld from the public in such a manner “as to leave no discretion on the issue.”13
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Exempt information includes any item that concerns (1) agricultural operations, farming
or conservation practices, or the land itself and (2) geospatial data about agricultural
land or operations.14 Both types of information are routinely provided by agricultural
producers and owners of agricultural land in order to participate in USDA subsidy, grant,
and loan programs. The agency uses this information to determine the eligibility for
participation in these programs, to verify the features of an agricultural operation, and
to monitor compliance with regulations that govern benefit payments. The exemption
defines “agricultural operations” very broadly to include the production and marketing of
agricultural commodities and livestock.15
Geospatial information is data identified according to a specific location or data that is
referenced to a place or a set of geographic coordinates.16 As a result, geospatial information
is one of the most detailed types of information available. USDA maintains a geographic
information system (GIS) database, which includes boundary information, land features,
crop types, soil type, and Common Land Unit (CLU) data.17 When geospatial information
is fed into a GIS program, it enables an in-depth analysis of variables in isolation or in
combination with other factors. If this information were not sequestered by the exemption,
it could provide an unprecedented capacity for government agencies and the public
to generate maps of floodplains and responses to natural hazards, among other useful
applications.
Although section 1619 is broadly drafted, it does provide for limited disclosure. First,
it authorizes release of information if necessary to respond to disease or pest threats to
agriculture. Second, it permits disclosure of information if the agricultural producer or
owner of agricultural land consents. Third, it does not affect the disclosure of information
that has been compiled into a statistical or aggregate form that does not identify individual
information. Finally, section 1619 does not affect disclosure to other government agencies or
persons who are hired to provide technical or financial assistance to agricultural operations
in cooperation with USDA programs. However, any additional information generated
by these participants is also exempt from disclosure. USDA has also interpreted section
1619 in a manner that further provides that information cannot be shared for “general
regulatory or enforcement purposes.”18
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Table 1: USDA Reliance on Section 1619 to Deny FOIA Requests19
Fiscal Year

Number of FOIA Denials
Based on Section 1619

Number of FOIA Denials Based on
Other Exemption 3 Statutes

2008

167

74

2009

432

63

2010

344

62

2011

385

100

Total

1,328

299

It is worth noting that section 1619 is not the only example of unwarranted, broad secrecy
protections achieved by agricultural producers in federal and state laws:
•• Air releases of hazardous substances from animal waste, including methane and
ammonia, are exempt from disclosure under federal environmental laws.20
•• The state of Maryland requires farmers to prepare nutrient management plans in
order to remediate harmful nutrient loading in the Chesapeake Bay. These plans
may be disclosed but any information identifying the individual for whom the
nutrient management plan was prepared must be withheld.21
•• Several states have enacted “ag-gag” laws that criminalize disclosure of media—
e.g., photos or video—that record the treatment of animals or other working and
environmental conditions at agricultural operations.22
Improbable Justifications: Terrorism and Privacy
Proponents of agricultural secrecy claim that disclosure would open agricultural operations
to agro-terrorism. Disclosure requirements for other similarly situated sectors simply
have not led to these worst-case outcomes. Water treatment facilities and the overall water
infrastructure in the United States also provide critical services to the United States, on
par with agriculture. These facilities are strictly regulated, their locations are often public,
and if breached the impact would be widespread. They are nevertheless subject to public
reporting requirements, routine regulation, and public enforcement.23
Section 1619’s general prohibition on information disclosure did not appear until the 2002
Farm Bill, and the prohibition on disclosing geospatial information was added as part of
the 2008 Farm Bill.24 The geospatial prohibition was passed in direct response to the 2008
case Multi Ag Media LLC v. USDA, in which a federal appeals court ruled that the public
interest in USDA activities outweighed individual privacy interests in the information
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requested.25 Because the case predated section 1619, USDA denied the FOIA request on
the basis of FOIA Exemption 6, which protects privacy interests in government records.26
The federal court acknowledged valid privacy interests in the information that agricultural
operators provide to USDA. For example, information about crops, field productivity, land
types, and acreage “shed light on the financial condition of the [agricultural operator]” and
reveals financial information traceable to an individual.27
The court determined, however, that this privacy interest was outweighed by the public
interest in data that would allow the public to monitor USDA’s administration of its payment
programs.28 “[T]here is a special need for public scrutiny of agency action that distributes
extensive amounts of public funds in the form of subsidies and other financial benefits.”29
The court noted that with this information, “the public can more easily determine whether
USDA is catching cheaters and lawfully administering its subsidy and benefit programs.”30

Oversight Denied
Commodities and crop insurance payments constitute the overwhelming majority of USDA
payments: for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, commodities payments totaled nearly $25
billion and crop insurance payments totaled more than $23 billion, or 39 and 36 percent
respectively.31 These payments frequently send market signals to move land into production
to increase payments. For example, a USDA study found that increased insurance
subsidies in the mid-1990s encouraged the expansion of cultivated cropland, leading to an
increase in annual wind and water erosion.32 This same study concluded that policies that
increase incentives for crop cultivation and encourage crop production on marginal land
“may have disproportionately large unintended environmental consequences.”33 USDA
also administers more than 20 agricultural conservation programs. These programs are
intended to reduce soil erosion, enhance water quality and supplies, and improve wildlife
habitat. Over the past few decades, millions of acres have been enrolled in these programs,
and between 2008 and 2011 USDA distributed an estimated $10 billion in conservation
payments.34
A recent GAO study demonstrates the need for greater transparency in these programs, as
well as the need for information regarding how they are being administered. GAO found that
USDA has given commodities payments to deceased individuals, paid individuals who are
ineligible for payments because they exceed income thresholds, and gave money to people
who are not “actively engaged in farming.”35 The report found that some conservation
programs work at cross-purposes, undermining their collective effectiveness.36 For
example, some payments induce agricultural operators to convert native grasslands to
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cropland, to the detriment of native habitats and local water quality. Finally, GAO said
that duplicative program goals and overlapping eligibility requirements have resulted in
double-payments for some operators.37
USDA is not a traditional regulatory agency; its mission is to provide assistance and
promote agricultural operators and their products. By necessity, USDA field officers
maintain a friendly working relationship with agricultural operators, a relationship that
tends to downplay strong enforcement actions and rigorous monitoring and verification.38
The GAO report noted, “Almost half of USDA’s field offices did not implement farm-bill
conservation compliance provisions [as part of commodity and loan support programs]
as required, in part because the officers reported that they were uncomfortable with
their enforcement role.”39 The report quoted anonymous officers who found it “difficult
to cite farmers for noncompliance in the small communities where the [officers] and
farmers live and work.”40 Overall, GAO found USDA’s Farm Services Agency (FSA) waived
noncompliance decisions issued by field offices of USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS) 61 percent of the time, and frequently FSA did not adequately justify these
waivers.41
As one further indication of USDA’s preoccupation with pleasing agricultural producers, in
the 2002 Farm Bill, Congress required USDA to develop a database containing limited data
about government payments to agricultural producers. The information in the database
included the names of the recipients, surrogate tax identifications, and the addresses for
the parent entity beneficiary and the ultimate beneficiary. The database also tracked
payment information, including the amount, transaction date, and the program and fiscal
year.42 The Environmental Working Group (EWG) used this information to compile its
own database, revealing that USDA has given $277.3 billion in subsidies between 1995 and
2011, with 10 percent of all agricultural operations collecting 75 percent of all subsidies.43
Revealing the amount and recipients of these payments provoked calls for reform and
public outrage, and the 2012 Farm Bill contemplates an end to some of these payments.44
It appears evident that the agribusiness farm lobby returned to Congress and the 2008
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act turned the database into a discretionary program by
changing the wording of the provision from “shall” to “may.”45 USDA immediately dropped
efforts to update the database on the grounds that Congress did not appropriate the $7
million to administer the database.46 Despite serious concerns regarding the quality of
current information, USDA maintains that the information is still available, but only by
individual request and on a program-by-program basis.47
Obviously, GAO’s availability to conduct rigorous audits helps ensure some accountability
for the USDA programs that are shielded by secrecy. But GAO’s resource constraints
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permit it to perform such audits only once in every several years, as requested by Congress.
In the meantime, sequestering basic data from the public hobbles other efforts by public
interest groups to oversee the utility and effectiveness of such programs. It also hobbles
other government agencies that must waste considerable resources duplicating information
USDA has at its fingertips. The best example of these negative repercussions on the other
missions Congress has assigned to federal agencies is EPA’s efforts to enforce the Clean
Water Act with respect to large animal farms.

Keeping Agriculture Clean
Farmers rely heavily on irrigation, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and fungicides.
Agriculture consumes approximately 80 percent of the water used in the United States
and up to 90 percent in some western states. Heavy agricultural use of groundwater has
severely drawn down aquifers around the country, notably the Ogallala Aquifer beneath
the Great Plains and Texas. EPA cites agriculture as one of the top sources of impairment
for the nation’s waters.48 Agriculture accounts for 8.6 percent of the total greenhouse gas
emissions, including 80 percent of total nitrous oxide emissions and 31 percent of methane
emissions.49 Both of these gases are long-lived in the atmosphere and trap heat more
effectively than carbon dioxide, contributing significantly to climate change.
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) requires concentrated animal feeding operations, or
CAFOs,50 to obtain permits limiting their discharges into surface waters such as lakes, rivers,
streams, and creeks. CAFOs are agricultural operations that raise a threshold numbers of
animals. As noted earlier, they raise more than 40 percent of the livestock in the United
States.51 EPA estimates that CAFOs produce 60 percent of all the manure generated by all
farms that confine animals, and in 2003 USDA estimated that confined animals produced
more than 500 million tons of manure.52 This amount is three times the amount of raw
waste that humans generate.53 These operations typically apply the untreated manure
generated by the confined animals to the land as fertilizer, and the amount and frequency
of these applications is specified in the discharge permit. Unfortunately, because EPA
and the states have dithered in enforcing these provisions, only 8,000 of 20,000—or 40
percent—of CAFOs have required permits.54

C

E

N

T

E

R

F

O

R

P

R

O

G
7

R

E

S

S

I

V

E

R

E

F

O

R

M

Agricultural Secrecy
Going Dark Down on the Farm: How Legalized Secrecy
Gives Agribusiness a Federally Funded Free Ride

Table 2: Pollutants in Manure
Pollutant

Examples

Potential Harm

Nutrients

Nitrogen, phosphorus, and
potassium

Excess nutrients promote explosive algal growth, which can lead
to dead zones and outbreaks of cyanobacteria.

Pathogens

E. coli, salmonella, and other
bacteria, viruses, and protozoa

More than 40 diseases found in manure can be transferred to
humans, including those that cause Salmonellosis, Tuberculosis,
Leptospirosis, gastrointestinal illnesses, trichinosis, and
Giardiasis.

Heavy Metals

Arsenic, lead, iron, cadmium, and
manganese

Accumulation in the human body can lead to kidney problems,
nervous system disorders and negative impacts on IQ,
cardiovascular effects, diabetes, reproductive effects, and
cancers in multiple tissues.

Pharmaceuticals
and Antibiotics

Growth hormones and antibiotics

Presence of growth hormones in the water affects the
reproductive systems of aquatic species.55 Non-therapeutic use
of antibiotics in animals has been linked to increased antibiotic
resistance bacteria that can infect humans.56

Other

Cleaning fluids, heavy metals,
synthetic fertilizers, and pesticides

Toxic chemicals can lead to a variety of developmental impacts.

In October 2011, EPA proposed a rule to collect more information about CAFOS under
CWA section 308, which allows EPA to collect information that is needed to administer
CWA water quality programs. EPA sought five pieces of information:
(1) the basic contact information for the CAFO owner or authorized representative;
(2) the location of the CAFO, either by global-positioning system coordinates or by the
street address;
(3) if the CAFO applies manure to land, the total number of acres available for landapplication;
(4) the NPDES permit status; and
(5) the type of animal that is confined.57
Most of this information is already in USDA’s possession. If USDA shared information with
EPA and the states regarding large animal feeding operations that potentially constitute
CAFOs, permitting and enforcement could be done far faster and more efficiently.
A second example of agricultural secrecy interfering with EPA’s ability to protect human
health and the environment is in the enforcement of section 404 of the CWA. This section
regulates the discharge of dredged or fill materials into the waters of the United States,
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including wetlands and other surface waters. A 2009 report by EPA’s Office of the Inspector
General concluded that EPA should coordinate better with other federal agencies, including
the NRCS. The report noted that the 2008 Farm Bill and section 1619 ended cooperation
between the two agencies.58 Because USDA can no longer release the delineation of
wetlands, EPA must now contact individual landowners directly for this information, or
the landowner must give consent for the delineations to be released. The report cited an
enforcement action that EPA Region 1 developed against a landowner for filling wetlands,
only to learn later that the NRCS classified the land as farmland and thus exempt from
404 requirements.59 Because NCRS interpreted section 1619 as prohibiting disclosure of
wetland delineations, EPA wasted time and resources in developing an enforcement action
that was ultimately futile.60

Recommendations
Congress should repeal section 1619, allowing other federal agencies, state and tribal
governments and agencies, and the public to access information held by USDA.
USDA programs that use taxpayer funds should be open, transparent, and accessible.
Understanding where this money is going and for what purposes is key to holding
USDA accountable for administering public funds and to holding the agricultural sector
accountable for the water pollution it causes in rivers, lakes, and coastal waters across
the country. This information is also important to recognize the efforts and success of
agricultural operations in improving water quality.
Agricultural secrecy has both direct and indirect impacts on a wide range of areas in the
public and private sectors. It contravenes the open-government ethic behind the Freedom
of Information Act and the tenets of democracy, and it prevents other federal agencies
from implementing and enforcing the law. It also results in time-consuming and resourcewasting efforts to replicate the information.
A vibrant democracy thrives on transparency and the ability of the public to scrutinize
agency action. The environmental compliance requirements and voluntary conservation
programs to control pollution from agricultural operations play a crucial role in mitigating
the environmental harms from agriculture. This role only makes the public interest in
knowing whether USDA has effectively spent billions of dollars even more compelling.
Agricultural secrecy impedes basic efforts to hold governmental agencies and payment
recipients accountable for the public funding they administer and receive.
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APPENDIX A: Text of Section 1619 7 U.S.C. § 8791
Information gathering
(a) Geospatial systems. The Secretary shall ensure that all the geospatial data of the
agencies of the Department of Agriculture are portable and standardized.
(b) Limitation on disclosures.
(1) Definition of agricultural operation. In this subsection, the term “agricultural
operation” includes the production and marketing of agricultural commodities and
livestock.
(2) Prohibition. Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), the Secretary, any
officer or employee of the Department of Agriculture, or any contractor or cooperator
of the Department, shall not disclose-(A) information provided by an agricultural producer or owner of agricultural
land concerning the agricultural operation, farming or conservation practices,
or the land itself, in order to participate in programs of the Department; or
(B) geospatial information otherwise maintained by the Secretary about
agricultural land or operations for which information described in subparagraph
(A) is provided.
(3) Authorized disclosures.
(A) Limited release of information. If the Secretary determines that the
information described in paragraph (2) will not be subsequently disclosed
except in accordance with paragraph (4), the Secretary may release or disclose
the information to a person or Federal, State, local, or tribal agency working in
cooperation with the Secretary in any Department program-(i) when providing technical or financial assistance with respect to the
agricultural operation, agricultural land, or farming or conservation
practices; or
(ii) when responding to a disease or pest threat to agricultural
operations, if the Secretary determines that a threat to agricultural
operations exists and the disclosure of information to a person or
cooperating government entity is necessary to assist the Secretary in
responding to the disease or pest threat as authorized by law.
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(4) Exceptions. Nothing in this subsection affects-(A) the disclosure of payment information (including payment information and
the names and addresses of recipients of payments) under any Department
program that is otherwise authorized by law;
(B) the disclosure of information described in paragraph (2) if the information
has been transformed into a statistical or aggregate form without naming any-(i) individual owner, operator, or producer; or
(ii) specific data gathering site; or
(C) the disclosure of information described in paragraph (2) pursuant to the consent
of the agricultural producer or owner of agricultural land.
(5) Condition of other programs. The participation of the agricultural producer or
owner of agricultural land in, or receipt of any benefit under, any program administered
by the Secretary may not be conditioned on the consent of the agricultural producer
or owner of agricultural land under paragraph (4)(C).
(6) Waiver of privilege or protection. The disclosure of information under paragraph
(2) shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection under
Federal law, including trade secret protection.
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Going too Easy? Maryland’s Criminal Enforcement of Water Pollution Laws Protecting
the Chesapeake Bay, CPR White Paper No. 1212 (September 2012). This paper examines
trends in criminal enforcement of water pollution laws in Maryland, concluding that
criminal enforcement is an underused but potentially powerful tool for deterrence.
Fairness in the Bay: Environmental Justice and Nutrient Trading, CPR Briefing Paper
No. 1208 (August 2012). This paper examines nutrient trading through the lens of
environmental justice. It assesses the potential impacts of trading on low-income and
minority communities and recommends ways to integrate environmental justice into
trading programs in the Bay region.
Manure in the Bay: A Report on Industrial Animal Agriculture in Maryland and
Pennsylvania, CPR Briefing Paper No. 1206 (June 2012). This report provides a substantive
and detailed look at the CAFO and other AFO programs in Maryland and Pennsylvania, as
well as a general overview of the federal CAFO program. The paper also identifies concrete
and practical recommendations for improving how the waste generated by animal industrial
agriculture is managed and controlled by EPA, the Maryland Department of Environment
(MDE), and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
Accountability: Water Quality Trading in the Chesapeake Bay, CPR Briefing Paper No.
1205 (May 2012). To ensure accountability in water quality trading, this paper makes
specific recommendations for designing the program, avoiding environmental inequities,
and ensuring strong enforcement.
Back to Basics: An Agenda for the Maryland General Assembly to Protect the Environment,
CPR Briefing Paper No. 1110 (October 2011). This paper recommends that MDE should
increase permit fees to accurately reflect the cost of administering permits; increase the
state penalty maximum to match the federal penalty maximum; explicitly recover the
economic benefit of non-compliance in penalty calculations; and establish a mandatory
minimum penalty for certain violations.
Ensuring Accountability in Chesapeake Bay Restoration: Metrics for the Phase I
Watershed Implementation Plans (August 2010). CPR developed a set of metrics to grade
the Bay jurisdictions’ Phase I Watershed Implementation Plans. The metrics address (1)
the transparency of information in the WIPs in providing key information about their
pollution control programs and (2) the strength of the programs in making actual pollution
reductions. Using these metrics to grade the WIPs provides a clear and understandable tool
for monitoring each state’s commitment to restoration.
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Missing the Mark in the Chesapeake Bay: A Report Card for the Phase I Watershed
Implementation Plans, CPR White Paper No. 1102 (January 2011). This report card applied
the metrics from Ensuring Accountability to the Chesapeake Bay states’ and the District
of Columbia’s final Phase I Watershed Implementation Plans. The final grades reflected
mediocre commitments and performance because the final plans were light on providing
specific commitments for actions needed to achieve the required pollution reductions, and
generally did not pledge dedicated funding for the proposed programs.
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short, CPR White
Paper No. 1004 (April 2010). This paper examines trends in CWA enforcement and MDE’s
enforcement budget and workforce for the period between 2000 and 2009. The report
recommends that the Maryland General Assembly provide additional funding to account
for the dramatic increase in MDE’s workload; that MDE recover any economic benefit
achieved by noncompliance from violators and increase on-site monitoring and inspection
activities; and that MDE embrace citizen suits as a tool to supplement its own enforcement
program.
The Clean Water Act: A Blueprint for Reform, CPR White Paper No. 802 (May 2008). The
CWA has accomplished much since its passage in 1972, but much more remains to be done.
This Blueprint presents a number of specific and meaningful reforms for the CWA that
address existing problems and prepare for the new problems climate change will create.
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